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1 Introduction
We use some tools of algebraic topology to give a uni￿ed treatment of several results on stable
sets and the existence of general equilibria.
1.1 De￿nition and elementary properties of essential sets
Let (M;@M) and (T;@T) be compact manifolds with boundary of dimension m and t respec-
tively.
Let ￿1 and ￿2 be the projections (M;@M) ￿ (T;@T) ! (T;@T) and (M;@M) ￿ (T;@T) !
(M;@M) respectively.
All homology coe¢ cients will be assumed to be in a ￿eld of characteristic zero.
It is assumed that the manifolds are oriented, ￿M will denote the orientation class of (M;@M).
To avoid trivial pathologies we assume that all spaces are CW complexes ( or ANR or suban-
alytic or your favourite ￿nice￿space).
De￿nition 1.1 A closed subset ￿ ￿ (M;@M) ￿ (T;@T) is called essential if the induced map
on cohomology
Ht(T;@T) ! Ht(￿)
is injective.
1.2 Families of solutions of equations and ￿xed point sets are essential
A parameterized family of maps is a continuous map f : T ￿ M ! N, the space T functions
as parameter space. For t 2 T, by ft we mean the restriction of f to ftg ￿ M. We consider
the set
￿ := f(t;m)jf(t;m) = n0g
of points that map onto n0 under f.
Theorem 1.2 Let f : T￿M ! N be a parameterized family of maps such that m = n. Further
assume that n0 = 2 ft(@M) for all t 2 T. If degf 6= 0, then the projection map ￿ : ￿ ! T is
essential.
Proof. Let a be a generator of Hm(N;N ￿n0). Denote f￿(a) 2 Hm(T ￿M;T ￿M ￿￿) by
a. Let a also denote the class a as an element of Hm(T ￿ M;T ￿ @M). Let ￿ 2 Hn(M;@M)
be the oriented class. Given x 2 Hk(T) consider the map x 7! (a [ ￿￿x) n ￿, where [ is the
cupproduct, and n is the slant product. We have
(a [ ￿￿x) n ￿ = (a ￿ x) n ￿ = (a n ￿) [ x = (degf) ￿ x:Essentiality 2
So, if degf 6= 0, the map x 7! ￿￿x is injective when restricted to supp(a), and hence also
injective on ￿.
For a parameterized family of functions f : T ￿ M ! M, let
￿ := f(t;m)jf(t;m) = mg
be the set of ￿xed points of f. Denote for each t 2 T the Lefschetz number of ft by L(ft).
Theorem 1.3 Let f : T ￿M ! M be a parameterized family of maps, and assume that there
exists an L(f) 6= 0 such that L(ft) = L for all t 2 T. Then the projection map ￿ : ￿ ! T is
essential.
Proof. Let ￿ 2 Hk(M ￿ M;M ￿ @M) and ￿ 2 Hk(M ￿ M;@M ￿ M) be the images of ￿ 2
Hk(M;@M) under the homomorphisms induced by the maps m 7! (m;m) and m 7! (m;f(m))
respectively. Let d 2 Hk(M ￿ M;@M ￿ M) and g 2 Hk(M ￿ M;M ￿ @M) be their PoincarØ
duals. The Lefschetz number is, by de￿nition, L(f) = hd [ g;￿ ￿ ￿i, where h￿;￿i denotes the
algebraic duality operator between cohomology and homology.
Write d = 1￿d 2 Hk(T ￿M ￿M;T ￿@M ￿M) and g = 1￿g 2 Hk(T ￿M ￿M;T ￿M ￿@M).
Note that d[g has support near ￿ ￿ T ￿M ,! T ￿M ￿M where the second inclusion is the
diagonal.
As before consider the map A that assigns to an element x 2 Hk(T) the element A(x) :=
￿￿(x[d[g)=￿￿￿. As before we that A(x) = L(f)x. So, the map ￿￿ is injective from Hk(T)
into Hk(N") where N" is any neighborhood of ￿. This implies that it is injective in ￿ Cech
cohomology.
2 Existence of Stable Sets
A KM perturbation of the game ￿ = (N;u) is a vector ￿ = (￿i)i2N where ￿i = (￿i(si))si2Si is
a vector of non-negative numbers ￿i(si). In the ￿-perturbed game ￿(￿) each player i is forced
to play each pure strategy si with probability at least ￿i(si). The set of KM perturbations is
denoted by K. By E we denote the set of pairs (￿;￿) in K ￿ ￿ for which the mixed strategy
pro￿le ￿ is a Nash equilibrium of the game ￿(￿).
For " > 0 we use the following notation. A KM perturbation ￿ is of size " when k￿k1 ￿ ".
By K" we denote the set of KM perturbations ￿ 2 K of size ". Let @K" be the set of KM
perturbations ￿ 2 K" for which there is a player i 2 N and a pure strategy si 2 Si withEssentiality 3
￿i(si) 2 f0;"g. For a set T ￿ E, we write T" for the set of pairs (￿;￿) 2 T for which ￿ is of size
". By @T" we denote the vertical boundary of T"; the set of pairs (￿;￿) 2 T" with ￿ 2 @K".
Let ￿ : K￿￿ ! K be the orthogonal projection map that assigns ￿ to the pair (￿;￿) 2 K￿￿.
A closed set T ￿ E is a germ if for every su¢ ciently small size " > 0,
(1) T" n @T" is connected,
(2) T" equals the closure of T" n @T", and
(3) the map ￿ : (T";@T") ! (K";@K") is essential.
A closed set S ￿ ￿ is stable if there exists a germ T ￿ E with
S = f￿ 2 ￿j(0;￿) 2 Tg:
Theorem 2.1 Every ￿nite game in strategic form has a stable set.
Proof. Take a ￿nite game in strategic form ￿ = (N;u). De￿ne the map f : K ￿ ￿ ! ￿ as
follows. For ￿ 2 ￿, de￿ne ri(￿) = (ri(￿)(si))si2Si by, for each si 2 Si,
ri(￿)(si) = ui(￿jsi) ￿ ui(￿):
For (￿;￿) 2 K ￿ ￿, de￿ne gi(￿;￿) = (gi(￿;￿)(si))si2Si by
gi(￿;￿)(si) = maxf￿(si) + ri(￿)(si);￿ig:
De￿ne "￿ > 0 by
"￿ =
1
2
￿ max
i2N
￿
1
jSij
￿
;
so that the strategy space of the perturbed game ￿(￿) is of full dimension for each KM per-
turbation ￿ of size "￿.
Claim. Suppose ￿ is of size "￿ and ￿ is feasible for ￿. Then
P
si2Si gi(￿;￿)(si) > 0.
De￿ne
fi(￿;￿)(si) =
gi(￿;￿)(si)
P
si2Si gi(￿;￿)(si)
:
Claim. The function f : K ￿ ￿ ! ￿ satis￿es the conditions of Theorem 1.3.Essentiality 4
3 On Monetary Equilibria
In the next application, we extend the canonical general equilibrium model with monetary
exchange of DrŁze and Polemarchakis (2001), a model that is compatible with Chapter 2 of
Woodford (2003) and can be viewed as the general equilibrium extension of that model. We
extend it to deal with the case of general initial endowments of money.
Consider a private ownership monetary economy E = (T ;(Xh;￿h;eh;nh;￿h;￿
h)h2H;r): Such
an economy consists of H individuals and one central bank.
There is an event tree T with the set of date-events S as nodes. The cardinality of S is S:
The set S is partitioned into subsets S0;:::;ST; where St are the date-events at date t: The
set of successors of date-event st is denoted by s
+
t ; a subset of St+1: The unique predecessor
of st is denoted by s
￿
t ; an element of St￿1: Date t represents the starting point of period t:
Period t ends at date t + 1 and is interpreted as the time interval separating a node from its
successor, i.e. a time interval of unspeci￿ed length between date t and date t+1 during which
transactions take place. We will refer to date-events st and periods st to distinguish between
points and intervals of time.
At date-event st there is trade in L commodities and js
+
t j one-period Arrow securities.1 An
Arrow security for date-event st+1 pays one nominal unit if and only if date-event st+1 occurs.
Because of the availability of Arrow securities, markets are sequentially complete.
For notational convenience we introduce at each terminal date-event sT 2 ST an elementary
security that pays one unit of money at the end of that date-event. We therefore extend the
date-event tree by a set of states ST+1 with the same cardinality as ST and use labels sT+1 to
denote the date-events in ST+1: Every date-event in ST has exactly one successor in ST+1:
Commodity prices at date-event st are denoted e pst and belong to RL
+: For st 2 (S[ST+1)nf0g;
the Arrow security for date-event st is traded at date-event s
￿
t at price e qst:
At the beginning of each date-event st; the central bank sets the interest rate rst: The central
bank supplies money balances as demanded by the households. For ￿ 2 [t;t + 1]; aggregate
money balances issued by the bank at ￿ are mb
st(￿); a non-negative quantity. Households obtain
a bank loan as a counterpart to money borrowed. Aggregate bank loans at time ￿; bc
st(￿);
are by de￿nition equal to aggregate money balances issued at ￿; mb
st(￿): Aggregate money
1We have in mind that there is a complete set of security markets at every date-event, but without loss of
generality we can restrict attention to the case where only one-period securities are traded.Essentiality 5
balances in period st equal mb
st =
R t+1
￿=t mb
st(￿)d￿; and also equal aggregate bond holdings in
period st; bc
st =
R t+1
￿=t bc
st(￿)d￿: At the end of period st; the bank is entitled to rstbc
st monetary
units of interests payments, and makes pro￿ts, seignorage, equal to ￿ vc
st = rstbc
st: We use ￿ to
indicate end-of-period values. The central bank issues the entire seignorage as dividends to its
shareholders at the end of the period. Household h receives ￿
h￿ vc
st at the end of period st:
A standard no-arbitrage argument implies that at equilibrium the sum of the prices of the Arrow
securities must be equal to 1=(1 + rst): At no-arbitrage prices asset demand is indeterminate
as any household is indi⁄erent between holding one unit less of the bank loan and one unit
more of every Arrow security. To lift this indeterminacy, we will set beginning-of-period bank
loan equal to zero for every household.
At the beginning of a date-event st 2 S; household h has wealth given by the initial endowment
of money nh
st; returns from investments in elementary securities in the previous period, ￿h
st;
minus the bank loan at the end of the previous period, ￿ bh
s
￿
t
: Since the beginning-of-period bank
loan has been normalized to zero, this bank loan equals net expenditures on commodities in
the previous period plus interest payments minus dividends received,
￿ bh
s
￿
t
= e ps
￿
t (xh
s
￿
t
￿ eh
s
￿
t
) + rs
￿
t bh
s
￿
t
￿ ￿ vh
s
￿
t
;
where bh
s
￿
t
=
R t
￿=t￿1 bh
s
￿
t
(￿)d￿ is the bank loan of household h in period s
￿
t and ￿ vh
s
￿
t
= ￿
h￿ vc
s
￿
t
:
Although mb
st(￿) = bc
st(￿) is a non-negative quantity, for some households h it may be the case
that bh
st(￿) < 0; in particular for those household with negative excess demands in period st:
Household h invests its wealth in Arrow securities ￿h
st+1; where st+1 2 s
+
t : The no-arbitrage
constraint speci￿es
X
st+12s
+
t
e qst+1 =
1
1 + rst
:
Under this condition, uniform holdings of Arrow securities are perfect substitutes for bank
loans, and household demands are indeterminate. Since we have lifted this indeterminacy by
setting beginning-of-period bank loans equal to zero for every household we have implicitly
imposed that the household invests its entire wealth in elementary securities.
Household h faces the following sequence of budget constraints
P
s12s
+
0 e qs1￿h
s1 = nh
s0;
P
st+12s
+
t e qst+1￿h
st+1 = nh
st + ￿h
st ￿￿ bh
s
￿
t
; st 2 S n f0g;
0 = ￿h
sT+1 ￿￿ bh
s
￿
T+1
; sT+1 2 ST+1;Essentiality 6
and the accounting identities
￿ bh
st = e pst(xh
st ￿ eh
st) + rstbh
st ￿ ￿ vh
st; st 2 S;
mh
st = bh
st; st 2 S:
The correspondence ￿h : RSL
+ ￿ Xh ! RS de￿nes the transaction technology of household h:
It assigns to each non-negative price system e p and consumption bundle xh a set of vectors of
amounts of money withdrawn at periods st 2 S that are needed to carry out purchases and
sales involved in consumption xh at prices e p:
A household takes prices (e p; e q); interest rates r; and dividends ￿ vh as given and chooses a maxi-
mal element (xh;￿h;mh) for ￿h; the preference relation of household h de￿ned on Xh; subject
to the constraints imposed by the consumption set, xh 2 Xh; the transaction technology,
mh 2 ￿h(e p;xh); the sequence of budget constraints
P
s12s
+
1 e qs1￿h
s1 = nh
s0;
P
st+12s
+
t e qst+1￿h
st+1 = nh
st + ￿h
st ￿ e ps
￿
t (xh
s
￿
t
￿ eh
s
￿
t
) ￿ rs
￿
t mh
s
￿
t
+ ￿ vh
s
￿
t
; st 2 S n f0g;
0 = ￿h
sT+1 ￿ e ps
￿
T+1(xh
s
￿
T+1
￿ eh
s
￿
T+1
) ￿ rs
￿
T+1mh
s
￿
T+1
+ ￿ vh
s
￿
T+1
; sT+1 2 ST+1:
The budget set Bh(e p; e q; ￿ vh) consists of all tuples (xh;￿h;mh) satisfying the restrictions speci-
￿ed above.
De￿nition 3.1 A competitive equilibrium for the monetary economy (T ;(Xh;￿h;eh;nh;￿h;￿
h)h2H;r)
is a tuple (e p￿; e q￿;x￿;￿￿;m￿) such that
(a) dividends satisfy
￿ v￿c
st = rstm￿c
st; st 2 S;
￿ v￿h
st = ￿
h￿ v￿c
st; st 2 S;
(b) the no-arbitrage conditions hold,
X
st+12s
+
t
e qst+1 =
1
1 + rst
; st 2 S;
(c) for each h; (x￿h;￿￿h;m￿h) is ￿h-maximal on Bh(e p￿; e q￿; ￿ v￿h);
(d) commodity markets clear,
P
h x￿h =
P
h eh;
(e) Arrow security markets clear,
P
h ￿￿h = 0;
(f) banks supply money demanded, m￿b =
P
h m￿h:Essentiality 7
On top of A1￿ A3, we make the following assumptions.
A4 Aggregate monetary endowments are zero:
P
h nh = 0:
A5 For every h; ￿h; is lower hemi-continuous and closed, is convex-valued, for every e p 2 RSL
+
there exists (xh;mh) 2 Xh ￿ ￿RS
+ such that xh ￿ eh and mh 2 ￿h(e p;xh); monetary
needs are not positively a⁄ected by commodities with zero prices: if mh 2 ￿h(e p;xh) and
xh 2 Xh satis￿es xh ￿ xh while pstl = 0 for ￿ xh
stl > xh
stl implies mh 2 ￿h(e p;xh); monetary
needs are bounded: there are continuous functions nh;nh : RSL
+ ￿ Xh ! RS such that
mh 2 ￿h(e p;xh) implies mh ￿ nh(e p;xh) and (minfmh
st;nh
st(e p;xh)g)st2S 2 ￿h(e p;xh):
A6 Only the bank can create money: if x 2
Q
h Xh satis￿es
P
h xh =
P
h eh and, for some
e p 2 RSL
+ ; for h 2 H; mh 2 ￿h(e p;xh); then
P
h mh ￿ 0:
A7 The bank is owned by the households: for every h; ￿
h ￿ 0; and
P
h2H ￿
h = 1:
Notice that A5 implies A3.
A natural assumption, but not needed for equilibrium existence, is that ￿h be 0-homogeneous.
A8 mh 2 ￿h(e p;xh) implies, for every st 2 S; for every c > 0; mh 2 ￿h(p;x); where mh
st = cmh
st
and mh
st = mh
st; st 6= st; and pst = ce pst and pst = e pst; st 6= st:
Spot prices of Arrow securities, e qst; st 2 (S [ ST+1) n f0g; de￿ne present-value prices qst;
st 2 (S [ ST+1) n f0g of units of money at date-events in S [ ST+1 by setting
qs0 = 1;
qst = e qs1(st) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ e qst￿1(st) ￿ e qst; st 2 (S [ ST+1) n f0g; (1)
where s￿(st) denotes the unique predecessor of st at date ￿ < t:
The sequence of budget constraints of household h can be consolidated into a single present-
value constraint. Indeed,
X
st2S
qst
X
st+12s
+
t
e qst+1￿h
st+1
= nh
s0 +
X
st2Snfs0g
qst(nh
st + ￿h
st ￿ e ps
￿
t (xh
s
￿
t
￿ eh
s
￿
t
) ￿ rs
￿
t mh
s
￿
t
+ ￿ vh
s
￿
t
)
+
X
sT+12ST+1
qsT+1(￿h
sT+1 ￿ e ps
￿
T+1(xh
s
￿
T+1
￿ eh
s
￿
T+1
) ￿ rs
￿
T+1mh
s
￿
T+1
+ ￿ vh
s
￿
T+1
);
or equivalently, after cancelling the ￿-terms which appear on both sides with identical multi-
plicands, and rearranging terms, we obtain
X
st2(S[ST+1)nf0g
qst(e ps
￿
t xh
s
￿
t
+ rs
￿
t mh
s
￿
t
) =
X
st2S
qstnh
st +
X
st2(S[ST+1)nf0g
qst(e ps
￿
t eh
s
￿
t
+ ￿ vh
s
￿
t
):Essentiality 8
Since
P
st2s
+
t e qst = 1=(1 + rst); we ￿nd
X
st2S
￿
pst
1 + rst
xh
st +
qstrst
1 + rst
mh
st
￿
=
X
st2S
￿
qstnh
st +
pst
1 + rst
eh
st +
qst
1 + rst
￿ vh
st
￿
; (2)
where, by de￿nition, pst = qste pst; st 2 S: The set Q of strictly positive state prices that do
not admit arbitrage equals
Q = fq 2 R
S+ST
++ jqs0 = 1; 8st 2 S;
X
st+12s
+
t
qst+1 =
qst
1 + rst
g:
Given (p;q; ￿ vh) 2 RSL
+ ￿Q￿RS; household h chooses a maximal element (xh;mh) with xh 2 Xh
and mh 2 ￿h((pst=qst)st2S;xh) subject to the constraint (2).
Intuition: Counting equations and unknowns, we have SL ￿ 1 independent market clearing
equations for commodities, in SL￿1+ST unknowns, the SL prices pstl; the ST ￿1 independent
prices qst: Indeed, there are S + ST prices qst; qs0 = 1 by de￿nition, and S no-arbitrage
constraints, which leaves us with ST ￿1 independent prices qst: One therefore expects a set of
equilibria with dimension ST:
De￿nition 3.2 Let ￿ ￿ T ￿ M be a set of equilibria. Then ￿ is essential with respect to T if
the projection map ￿ : ￿ ! T is essential.
We will show that the set of monetary equilibria is essential in the price index and in state
prices, where the price index is simply de￿ned as the sum of all nominal prices. In terms of
notation, we therefore now write an equilibrium as a tuple (e p; e q;x;￿;m;I(p);q(e q)); where I(e p)
is determined by the formula
I(e p) =
X
(st;l)2S￿L
e pstl
and q(e q) by (1).
Let Q" = fq 2 Qj8st 2 S; qst ￿ "g be the set of state prices where each state price is at least
equal to ": Clearly, if " is taken su¢ ciently small, the set Q" is non-empty and has dimension
ST ￿ 1: Fix such an " for the remainder of this section.
Since eh belongs to the interior of Xh and Q" is compact, there is a lowerbound I such that
for all e p 2 RLS
+ with I(e p) ￿ I for any household h; its budget set has a non-empty interior
whenever seignorage ￿ vh is non-negative. Fix such a lowerbound I as well as some I > I: Let P
be the set of prices e p such that I ￿ I(e p) ￿ I and let E be the set of monetary equilibria with
state prices in Q" and commodity prices in P:Essentiality 9
Theorem 3.3 Let the monetary economy (T ;(Xh;￿h;eh;nh;￿h;￿
h)h2H;r) satisfy A1￿ A7.
Then the set E is essential with respect to Q" ￿ [I;I]:
Proof. By a standard proof, following Debreu (1959), the set of attainable allocations of
commodities, i.e. the set of x 2
Q
h Xh such
P
h xh =
P
h eh; is compact. Let B be such that,
for every h; xh < B1LS: We compactify the economy by replacing consumption sets Xh by
b Xh; the subset of elements of Xh for which xh ￿ B1LS: We de￿ne Mh = [mh;mh]; where, for
st 2 S;
mh
st = min
(e p;xh)2P￿ b Xh
nh
st(e p;xh) and mh
st = max
(e p;xh)2P￿ b Xh
nh
st(e p;xh);
and replace transactions technology ￿h by b ￿
h; de￿ned by
b ￿
h(e p;xh) = ￿h(e p;xh) \ Mh:
Given (e p;q; ￿ vh) 2 P ￿ Q ￿ RLS
+ ; household h chooses a maximal element (xh;mh) with xh 2
b Xh and mh 2 b ￿
h(e p;xh) subject to the constraint (2). We denote the set of maximizers by
￿
h(e p;q; ￿ vh):
A standard proof, which follows Debreu (1959) since the constraint (2) is equivalent to the
usual budget constraint, shows that ￿
h is upper hemi-continuous on P ￿ Q ￿ RLS
+ :
At any st 2 S; in equilibrium the bank will issue a non-negative amount of money that is
bounded above by mb
st =
P
h2H mh
st:
We de￿ne the aggregate excess demand correspondence ￿ : P ￿ Q ￿ [0;mb] ! RLS ￿ RS by
￿(e p;q;mb) =
X
h2H
￿
h(e p;q;￿
h(mb
st)st2S) ￿
X
h2H
eh:
Let Z be a compact, convex set containing ￿(P ￿Q￿[0;mb]): We de￿ne the simplex ￿ = fd 2
RL
+ j
P
st;l2S￿L dst;l = 1g: We de￿ne the correspondence
’ : [I;I] ￿ Q" ￿ ￿ ￿ Z ! ￿ ￿ Z
by
’1(z) ￿ ’2(I;q;d;mb);
where
’1(z) = f￿ d 2 ￿ j ￿ d ￿ z ￿ d ￿ z; 8d 2 ￿g
and
’2(I;q;d;mb) = ￿(Id;q;mb):
Debreu￿ s proof applies in this case to show that ￿xed points correspond to equilibria, it is then
easy to show that that the set of equilibria is essential.Essentiality 10
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